University of Massachusetts Boston

ScholarWorks at UMass Boston
Economics Faculty Publication Series

Economics

1-1-2005

Why Equality? How Equality?: The Desirability of
a Focus on Income Distribution
Arthur MacEwan
University of Massachusetts Boston, arthur.macewan@umb.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/econ_faculty_pubs
Part of the Growth and Development Commons, and the Health Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
MacEwan, Arthur, "Why Equality? How Equality?: The Desirability of a Focus on Income Distribution" (2005). Economics Faculty
Publication Series. Paper 15.
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/econ_faculty_pubs/15

This Occasional Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economics Faculty Publication Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please
contact library.uasc@umb.edu.

Why Equality? How Equality?
The Desirability of a Focus on Income Distribution
Arthur MacEwan
Department of Economics
University of Massachusetts Boston
Paper for a Conference in Honor of Azizur Rahman Khan
Reflections on Employment, Inequality and Poverty Reduction
26 September 2005, ILO, Geneva
Abstract
Much of the discussion of economic development in low and middle income countries
and of poverty reduction has either ignored the issue of income distribution or has tended
to view income distribution only in terms of its impact on economic growth. In this
paper I argue that such an approach is misguided. I will explain, first, why I believe that
it is desirable to give a great deal of attention to income distribution in the analysis of
economic development and poverty reduction. My argument includes conceptual,
political and practical elements. Second, I will suggest some of the ways in which
economic programs might be structured when income distribution is a central
consideration. My purpose in this latter section of the paper will simply be to illustrate
what could be done, not to lay out any sort of general program for economic development
and poverty reduction.
JEL Classification: D31, I32, O15, O20
Key Words: development, distribution, poverty

Arthur MacEwan
Department of Economics
University of Massachusetts Boston
100 Morrissey Boulevard
Boston, MA 02125-3393
e-mail: arthur.macewan@umb.edu

DRAFT – PLEASE TREAT APPROPRIATELY

Why Equality? How Equality?
The Desirability of a Focus on Income Distribution
Arthur MacEwan
Department of Economics
University of Massachusetts Boston
Paper for a
Conference in Honor of Azizur Rahman Khan
Reflections on Employment, Inequality and Poverty Reduction
26 September 2005, ILO, Geneva

During 1967, Aziz Khan and I shared an office at the Pakistan Institute of
Development Economics at the Old Sind Assembly Building on Bunder Road in Karachi.
Together we constructed input-output matrices and capital account matrices for the then
two major regions of Pakistan, East and West. The construction of these sorts of data
sets, however useful, leads one to focus on things rather than people. We spent a lot of
time worrying about such matters as how to aggregate pucca and kutcha construction,
how to treat gur and ghee production, and how inputs to grain production might change
along with the introduction of the new seed varieties of the ‘green revolution.’ Although
tedious, it was interesting work, and it taught me a great deal about the technical aspects
of production. But it did not teach me much about people, about the conditions and needs
of peasants and workers in East and West Pakistan, about the social relations that
surrounded their work, or about the kinds of changes that might have improved their
conditions.
In the middle of our input-output efforts, Aziz took a break for several days and
focused his attention elsewhere. The result was his “What Has Been Happening to Real
Wages in Pakistan?” (Khan, 1967) It was a very instructive paper, partly because, based
on his usual meticulous examination of the data, Aziz had demonstrated (among other
things) that during the decade from the early 1950s to the early 1960s real wages were
stagnant or falling in both major regions of the country, in spite of the fact that, in those
days, Pakistan was held out as a relative economic development success story. More
important for me, however, the paper was a reminder of what economics is (or should be)
all about – the well-being of most people, especially those at the bottom, in any society.
It was something that one could easily forget, enmeshed as we were in our input-output
efforts.
That 1967 paper was an early entry into the long list of research projects and
publications that Aziz would undertake to examine – and, through examination, to try to
improve – the “well-being of most people.” In the analyses of employment, inequality,
and poverty in Bangladesh, China, and several other countries, Aziz and the people he

worked with were ahead of many economists in international institutions who have only
recently begun to give attention to these issues instead of focusing simply on economic
growth as the defining feature of economic development in low and middle income
countries.
Today, however, “poverty reduction” in particular has become the watchword in
development agencies, in international lending institutions, and among development
economists generally. The focus on poverty reduction perhaps reached a high point with
the publication in early 2005 of the Sachs Report, Investing in Development: A Practical
Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals. (UN Millennium Project, 2005)
Yet, much of the discussion of economic development in low and middle income
countries and of poverty reduction has either ignored the issue of income distribution or
has tended to view income distribution only in terms of its impact on economic growth.
In the entire text of the Sachs Report, neither the term “income distribution” nor the term
“distribution of income” appears, and nowhere in the Report’s “Ten Key
Recommendations” is there any reference to inequality or equality, except for the
inclusion of “gender equality” along with many other issues on which poverty reduction
strategies should focus (e.g., rural productivity, health, education, etc.)1
In this paper I would like to do two things. First, I will explain why I believe that
it is desirable to give a great deal of attention to income distribution in the analysis of
economic development and poverty reduction. My argument includes conceptual,
political and practical elements. Second, I will suggest some of the ways in which
economic programs might be structured when income distribution is a central
consideration. My purpose will simply be to illustrate what could be done, not to lay out
any sort of general program for economic development and poverty reduction. At
various points, I will note connections to Aziz’s writings.

1

There is in one place a use of the term “distribution of wealth,” but only in a box discussing the factors
affecting “The Poverty-Conflict Nexus.” Neither the word “redistribution” nor the term “land reform”
appears in the Report. As best I can tell, the closest that the Report comes to addressing the distributional
issues comes in Chapter 6, “Key elements for rapid scale-up,” in a section on “Infrastructure,” where the
following appears: “To prepare draft investment plans, many countries use population-to-facility ratios as
guidelines for determining how many of a given facility they need to build for their population. This is a
good start. But in the final strategy, countries will obviously need to conduct a more detailed analysis of
where their facilities are located, and where and how many they need to build or rehabilitate. When
building more facilities, countries also need to pay attention to equity of access. For example, many
developing countries have first-rate hospitals and modern schools in their capital cities, but dilapidated
facilities in their rural districts. A much more equitable distribution of resources is vital to achieving the
[Millennium] Goals. Countries thus need to create investment plans that explicitly aim to increase the
percentage of the population that has access to high quality facilities, such as the percentage of the rural
population that with access to a functioning clinic within 10 kilometers.” [emphasis added] (pp. 105-106).
This is a very limited substitute, to say the least, for addressing issues of income or wealth distribution.

Why Equality?
There is no question about the desirability of programs that raise the absolute
material well-being of the poor. Absolute poverty, however defined, is wide-spread in
the world, and creating conditions that move people – or, better yet, conditions that allow
them to move themselves – from less than one dollar a day or less than two dollars a day
to some higher material level is extremely important. Yet the exclusive focus on absolute
poverty, which omits direct and explicit consideration of the distribution of income, has
problems.
The first problem is conceptual. It is often misleading to conceive of poverty
simply in absolute terms – in terms, for example, of living on less than one dollar a day or
less than two dollars a day. We generally think of people in poverty as those who are
deprived of their needs, and “needs” are largely a social construct.2 They vary among
societies and over time. As a society’s average income rises, needs rise as well – not
simply in a psychological sense, though that is important, but also in a practical sense.
For example, as income rises in society, jobs tend to move out of and away from the
home, generating a need for transport facilities. As another and related example,
economic growth is generally accompanied by rising participation of women in the paid
labor force, generating needs for services (or home capital equipment) to replace the
work traditionally done in the home by women in most societies.
A society’s standard of needs, then, tends to rise as income rises, and it seems
reasonable to understand the standard as somehow related to the mean. In this sense,
how far one is (in terms of command over commodities) from the standard – that is, how
much one’s needs are not being met – is determined by how far one is from the mean.
The further people are below the mean, the greater their degree of poverty. This is what
is meant by “relative poverty.” In general, the greater the degree of inequality in the
distribution of income, the greater will be the degree of poverty in this relative sense.
Also, it is of course quite possible that with economic growth everyone’s income may
rise, but there may be no reduction in poverty defined in this way.3 (One might
alternatively think of the standard as being set by those at or near the top of the income
distribution, rather than by those at the mean. Then the gap between the top and bottom
becomes the measure of poverty.)4
2

To say that needs are largely a “social construct” is not to say that they have no relation to biological
reality. Biological factors are certainly relevant. An analogy exists to gender and sex. Gender is a social
construct but it certainly has a relationship to sex, a biological factor.
3

At least one standard dictionary defines poverty in these social terms. The Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary provides the following: “Poverty: 1 a : the state of one who lacks a usual or socially acceptable
amount of money or material possessions.” http://www.m-w.com.
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There are many problems with the concept of relative poverty or, more generally, relative well-being,
associated with the frame of reference for determining “relative.” There is, in particular, the problem of
what constitutes the society; people establish their standards differently in different regions of the same
nation, and they establish their standards partly on the basis of the situation in other countries. Also, there
is a time dimension. When economic growth takes place with an unchanging distribution of income, the
relative poverty conception may lead us to see even those at the bottom as being better off because the

Lest I be accused, in spite of my comments above, of failing to recognize that for
many people in the world absolute needs – in terms of basic biological needs – are not
being met and that those needs are not a social construct, my point is not that poverty is
simply a relative phenomenon. My point is that it is not simply and always an absolute
phenomenon. The two concepts have different relevance in different circumstances.
Where the distribution of income is dramatically unequal – in Brazil, South Africa,
increasingly in China, an even in some very low-income countries – relative poverty is of
considerable importance. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, where the level of income is
extremely low, and falling in several countries, absolute poverty may be the defining
issue – Niger leaps to mind in the middle of 2005. (However, the situation is never
simple: Niger is among the countries with extremely unequal income distributions. The
“share of the poorest quintile in national income or consumption” is only 2.6 percent in
Niger, compared to 2.2 percent in Brazil, 3.8 percent in Guatemala, and 3.0 percent in
Colombia. Several other very low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa are similarly
unequal.) (World Bank, 2004, pp. 254-55)
There is a large literature concerning the definition of poverty, not only dealing
with the issue of whether it is best understood and measured as an absolute or relative
phenomenon, but also whether it is a concept concerning commodities or capabilities and
many other facets of the issue.5 One of the things that is immediately clear in this
literature is the apparent but unstated belief among most participants that a onedimensional definition of poverty, or of economic well-being in general, is necessary.
While one-dimensional definitions and one-dimensional measurements often have
political appeal, they are probably seldom accurate ways to describe complex socioeconomic phenomenon.
The definition of a social problem affects how we understand it and how we try to
deal with it. Development programs based on a conception of poverty that is absolute
and that tend to ignore the distribution of income will be constructed differently and their
success will be measured differently than programs based on a more complex, multidimensional conception of poverty and development, one that takes account of relative as
well as absolute poverty. Most important, the absolute conception can readily – though
not automatically – become the rationale for programs that focus simply on growth.
A second problem with ignoring income distribution in the formulation of
development programs and in efforts to alleviate poverty is a problem of power. The
distribution of income (and wealth) is a central factor affecting social and political power,

standard is in part determined by past experience – they are relatively better off than they were. These are
real complications, but they do not undermine the concept itself. And they do not undermine the
importance of taking current income distribution into account in telling the story of people’s well-being;
they simply underscore the fact that current income distribution within a country is not the whole story.
5

I find Sen (1984) a particularly clear statement of the issues. Sen’s essay is reprinted in Subramanian
(1997), which contains several other useful relevant essays.

and power, in turn, is of overwhelming importance in affecting the nature of economic
change.
Political philosophers have long emphasized the importance of a relatively equal
distribution of income as a foundation for democracy.6 It seems virtually uncontroversial
to argue that, if income (and wealth) is very unequally distributed, it is unlikely that
meaningful democracy – i.e., popular control of government and not just the forms of
democracy – can be effective. Whether by using their money to influence directly
political life, shape the institutions (e.g., the media and the school system) that generate
popular ideology, or constrain popular decisions through the threat of disinvestment or
capital flight, the wealthy in any society, even a formally democratic society, have a
disproportionate amount of political power. (Wright, 2000)
Aside from the question of whether or not democracy is something to be valued in
itself in the economic development process, a lack of meaningful democracy is likely to
have detrimental impacts in terms of both absolute and relative poverty (and perhaps on
economic growth).7 People use political power to enhance their own economic positions,
and the connection between economic inequality and political power becomes a circular,
self-reinforcing relationship. A high degree of inequality means a relative lack of
political power for the poor which means less likelihood of economic changes that will
improve the conditions of the poor. The situation certainly falls under the heading of a
‘vicious cycle of poverty’ (and I shall return below to the possibilities for ways in which
the circle might be broken).8
As a practical matter, if income distribution and the issues of political power
associated with income distribution are ignored, proposals for improving the economic
conditions of the poor are likely to be unrealistic. For example, the Sachs Report makes
numerous proposals for expenditures to reduce poverty without much attention to how,
aside from foreign development assistance, these expenditures would be financed. How
will the wealthy, who have the resources and wield political power, be coerced or
persuaded to pay for the changes? The lack of any mention of land reform in the Sachs
Report is also worth noting, as it is hard to conceive of how, in many countries, progress
in rural areas can take place within the confines of existing land tenure relationships. The
problem is not simply economic – a problem of low productivity on large estates; it is

6

Reference needed here

7

Certainly by some widely accepted definitions of economic development, democracy is a central part of
the process. Also, democracy would seem an essential part of Sen’s development-as-freedom concept.
(Sen, 1999). And, furthermore, in light of Sen’s argument that famines tend not to occur in democracies
(Sen, 1981), democracy appears to be an important factor effecting an avoidance of the most absolute form
of poverty.
8

Conversely, it is generally recognized that programs of poverty reduction tend to be more effective when
the poor are involved in their formulation and implementation; see, for example, Joshi and Moore (2002).
The less the degree of inequality, the more likely that such “empowerment” will be meaningful.

also a question of power, as large landowners have no interest in paying for economic
change and, at times, actively resist the social change that comes with economic change.9
A third problem associated with focusing on absolute poverty and ignoring the
distribution of income is that the distribution of income in itself has direct impacts on the
material quality of people’s lives. As Wright (2000, p. 145) has stated the point: “income
inequality … fractures community, generates envy and resentment, and makes social
solidarity more precarious.”
The pernicious impacts of income inequality depend at least in part on the origins
and degree of the inequality. If, for example, the inequality is largely based on race or
ethnicity or gender, as is so often the case, then it will be generally perceived as unfair (at
least by those on the bottom) and generate considerable resentment. Similarly, when
inequalities are seen as arising from family privilege, they will tend to be viewed by
many people as illegitimate and unfair. Income inequalities that are seen as arising from
differences in skills or efforts are less likely to be viewed as illegitimate. Nonetheless, if
inequality is large, it is likely to be viewed as unfair because few people would view
legitimate bases of inequality (e.g., differences in effort) as generating large inequalities.
Illustrations of the social discontent that is generated by inequality are provided
by recent experience in China, where along with the extremely rapid rate of economic
growth has come a sharp rise of inequality. (Khan and Riskin, 2001) In November 2004,
the international press reported a string of “incidents of violence.” According to the
Christian Science Monitor of November 22, for example: “At least eight major incidents
of violence and rioting have erupted in recent weeks, against a backdrop of thousands of
minor incidents in recent years….The Chinese magazine Outlook put the 2003 figure of
local disturbances [at] about 58,000 involving an estimated 3 million persons.”
(Marquand, 2004) Such “incedents” have their particular catalysts, and basic causal
factors surely include the political situation in China. Yet both the Chinese leaders and
foreign commentators view the sharp inequalities, especially the rural-urban inequalities,
as significant factors. As a March 2005 New York Times article described the situation:
“Chinese leaders open their annual legislative session this weekend trying to resolve a
vexing pair of problems: the economy is growing too fast, and most people feel left out of
the boom. China’s bubbly economy … has produced a yawning wealth gap and fueled a
surge of social unrest that top leaders worry could undermine Communist rule. Although
the leadership has focused on social inequality and wealth distribution for over a year ...
there have been several mass riots and thousands of small protests over land seizures,
corruption and unpaid wages.” (Kahn, 2005)10
9

As Dreze and Sen (1995, p. 107) note in their discussion of India: “In some cases, the rural elite has been
known not only to be indifferent to the general promotion of local public services but even to obstruct their
expansion to prevent the empowerment of disadvantaged groups.” Also, Bowles (1978) has demonstrated a
connection between the concentration of land holdings and low levels of education, explaining the
association by the resistance of large land holders to the social change that would come with improvements
in education; also, see Alesina and Rodrik (1994).

10

Even more recently, on August 24, 2005, the New York Times reports: “[According to China’s] public
security minister … [there] were 74,000 mass incidents, or demonstrations and riots, that occurred in 2004,

There is nothing especially unusual in China’s experience with social conflict
arising in a period of rapid growth when that growth is accompanied by high or
increasing (or high and increasing) inequalities. Similar sorts of conflicts – all coming
under the general rubric of ‘riots’ – have marked periods of rapid growth in situations as
disparate as England in the late 18th century, Germany in the mid-19th century, and Brazil
in the mid-20th century. (Ackerman, 1974).
In addition to the overt social protest involved in riots and other forms of mass
action, expression of the fractured community, envy and resentment, and lack of social
solidarity that is generated by inequality appears in the form of crime. It is especially
relevant that the correlation, and apparent causal link, between inequality and violent
crime seems to be particularly clear. (Demombynes and Ozler, 2002; Kelly, 2000; and
Lederman et al, 2002) Likewise, there is substantial evidence – though also controversy
over the issue – that inequality contributes to poor health, and one of hypothesis attributes
this relationship in part to the social tensions (fractured community) that are generated by
inequality. (references).11
The point here is not simply that riots, crime and ill-health are negative social
outcomes, but that these outcomes are manifestations of the negative social consequences
of inequality. In addition, there is reason to believe that these outcomes also undermine
economic growth – an issue I will return to shortly.
The final reason offered here for giving emphasis to income distribution in
dealing with poverty and development concerns very practical matters.12 There are two
related practical matters that deserve attention: the difficulty of dealing with absolute
poverty without effecting a more equal distribution of income, and the possible positive
contribution of relative equality in the distribution of income to economic growth.

an increase from 58,000 the year before, and only 10,000 a decade ago.” The Times comments: “For
reasons that range from rampant industrial pollution to widespread evictions and land seizures by corrupt
local governments in cahoots with increasingly powerful property developers, ordinary Chinese seem to be
saying they are fed up and won’t take it any more.” And: “’There re a great many socioeconomic factors to
stimulate protest, such as the increasing gap between the rich and poor and many land and environmental
factors,’ said Wu Guoguang, a former government advisor and People’s Daily editorialist who now teaches
political science at the University of Victoria in Canada.”
11

Of course absolute poverty is a very important cause of poor health. And this is a good point to reiterate
that the argument here is not that relative poverty is more important than absolute poverty, but simply that
both are important.

12

There are other reasons that we might value relative equality in the distribution of income and wealth that
lie beyond my scope in this essay. One of these is the absolute ethical argument that it is simply unfair or
unjust for a society to tolerate large disparities of material well-being. Another is that there is a strong link
between the existing distribution of income and wealth and equality of opportunity. While there is very
wide acceptance of the desirability of equality of opportunity, it is often ignored that equality of
opportunity depends in large part on the existence of relative equality in the distribution of income and
wealth.

In his early study of the Bangladesh economy, Aziz Khan pointed out:
“In the context of the above [examination of absolute poverty in
Bangladesh/East Pakistan over the preceding decades], it is no longer in
doubt what the priorities of sensible planning must be. It no longer makes
sense to talk merely in terms of rates of growth when so much depends on
how the increment is distributed… Mere emphasis on the overall growth
rate will not necessarily solve these problems [of starvation, inadequate
housing and clothing, poor health and mass illiteracy]. In fact, the last two
decades of development planning in the then Pakistan is an outstanding
example of emphasizing the objective of overall growth…. In the name of
promoting growth, income was redistributed in favour of the (West
Pakistan) capitalists and traders through exchange rate policy and fiscal
policy, through the distribution at nominal prices of the entitlement to
scarce resources, through the suppression of working-class organization,
and a host of other direct and indirect measures. As a result, there has
been ‘impressive industrialization’ in West Pakistan. But income
distribution became worse, aggravating many of the above problems… If
the balance of political power at the central government had been
different, Bangladesh could have had a share of such industrialization and
growth while the problem of [absolute] poverty would have remained
unsolved and just as pressing!” (Khan, 1972, pp. 27-28; also see Griffin
and Khan, 1972)
More recently, in summarizing his analysis of a set of several UNDP and ILO/SIDA
country studies, Aziz Khan has given emphasis to this same practical point:
“Rapid economic growth and the containment of the forces of inequality
are essential for healthy and sustained [absolute] poverty reduction.
Increased inequality can offset the benefits of even a rapid rate of growth
as far as poverty reduction is concerned. Continued, or even improved,
equality of income distribution is an uncertain guarantee against increased
poverty when growth is weak and narrowly-based. Equality in this context
means maintaining at least an unchanged share of incremental income for
the poor, rather than holding down some overall indicator of income
distribution. This kind of equality is best ensured by a rapid expansion in
remunerative and productive employment.” [emphasis added] (Khan,
2005, p. 30)
And earlier in the same paper he illustrates the argument with the case of China:
“In the case of China, the sharp increase in inequality resulted in a fragile
poverty outcome despite its historically unprecedented rate of growth:
urban poverty during 1988-95 probably increased overall and in many
regions poverty failed to register a decline. The powerful effect of
distribution on poverty in China is also demonstrated by a subsequent

study which showed that the poverty reduction effect of a per cent increase
in personal income sharply increased during 1995-2002 over what it was
during 1988-95 because inequality stopped increasing during the second
period as compared to the sharp increase in inequality in the first period.”
(Khan, 2005, p. 9; also see Khan, 2004)
The argument that downward redistribution of income brings about the reduction
of absolute poverty and therefore should be a guiding principle of economic development
policy is generally countered with the claim that such downward redistribution will tend
to reduce the rate of economic growth and thus, in fact, increase (or fail to reduce as
rapidly as possible) absolute poverty. This claim held sway among economists across the
political spectrum for most of the last two hundred years and thus became the
‘conventional wisdom,’ to use Galbraith’s sarcastic term. It was based largely on the
belief that a more equal distribution of income would reduce savings (as the rich tend to
save at a higher rate than the poor) and thereby reduce investment and growth. In recent
years, the claim has also been buttressed by the allegation that inequality is needed to
generate the incentives that lead to greater investments and greater work effort.
Like much other ‘conventional wisdom’ the growth-necessitates-inequality
contention has been greatly weakened, if not entirely demolished, by the facts.13 Various
studies, first undertaken in the early 1990s, have demonstrated rather clearly the lack of a
positive correlation between greater inequality and a higher rate of economic growth.
Although these studies do not establish a clear link in the other direction – that is, they do
not clearly establish a positive, causal connection between relative equality and more
rapid economic growth – they do suggest that such a link may exist. (Alesina and Rodrik,
1994; Persson and Tabalinni, 1994; other references)14 At the very least, they establish
that such a link can exist – that is, under appropriate conditions, which could include
appropriate policies, a more equal distribution of income can raise the rate of economic
growth.

13

In the context of the quotation above from his 1972 study of the Bangladesh economy, Aziz Khan
provides a response to the growth-necessitates-inequality contention: “It was argued that the preoccupation
with the problem of income distribution would slow down the rate of growth as it would call for
distributing income away from the ‘saving class’, i.e., the capitalists, and in favour of the non-saving poorer
classes. … [But] the ‘saving classes’ do not seem to have saved at anything near the expected rate…
Moreover, what appears to be ‘impressive industrialization’, giving the industrialists enormous control over
resources, is on closer scrutiny of much lower value to the society when its contribution to real income is
accounted for by evaluating all inputs and outputs in relation to true social scarcities rather than at distorted
prices resulting from high and non-uniform effective protection. (Khan, 1972, pp. 27-28).
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The results of these studies have been challenged, for example, by ( ). However, what has not been
challenged and what seems to me most important, as I note, is that the results of these studies allow one to
reject the argument that an emphasis on a more equal distribution of income is necessarily in conflict with
more rapid economic growth. This, in turn, opens the door to the questions: which policies are most
consistent with both greater equality and more rapid growth? This is the question I will take up shortly.
For my own and more thorough discussion of these issues, see MacEwan (1999, esp. ch. 3).

There are several reasons that greater equality in the distribution of income could
contribute to a higher rate of economic growth. Both Alesina and Rodrik and Persson
and Taballinni suggest that inequality has a negative impact on growth because it
undermines social and political stability, and instability depresses savings and investment
rates. Clearly riots, crime, poor health – the various factors referred to above that reflect
fractured community – would not be auspicious bases for rapid economic expansion.
Also, greater equality may have positive impacts on technological change (a la
Habakkuk, 1962) and the structure of aggregate demand (Murphy et al, 1989). I have
argued elsewhere (MacEwan, 1999, ch. 3) that in fact a more equal distribution of income
can have positive incentive impacts, through an ‘efficiency wage’ type of effect, and can
also raise labor productivity through reducing the conflict and resentment associated with
great inequalities (the fairness issue).15
Experiences in East Asia suggest that relative equality in the distribution of
income may also have positive impacts on the rate of economic growth through bringing
about greater investment in social programs in general and schooling in particular.
Birdsall et al (1995) emphasize ‘virtuous circles’ in the East Asian experiences, by which
schooling contributed to both economic growth and greater income equality, and then
growth and equality contributed to greater investment in schooling. To the extent that
schooling is privately financed, inequality tends to reduce the overall level of educational
attainment because the poor are unable to afford the expense – either the direct expense
or the expense of income foregone or both. To the extent that schooling is publicly
financed, inequality tends to reduce educational attainment because of reluctance on the
part of those with money (and power) to pay for the schooling of ‘other people’s
children.’16 The causal nexus involving schooling (and other social programs), equality
and economic growth is potentially of special importance because of the policy options it
suggests.

How Equality?
In the remainder of this paper, I will put forward some aspects of policy that
would focus on the distribution of income as well as economic growth, and I will point
15

Furthermore, the argument on the other side, that greater inequality generates a higher rate of savings and
investment, is much weaker than it might first appear. It depends, first of all, on a classical, supply-side
notion of how investment is determined. If technological change – perhaps induced, as suggested above,
by factors related to greater equality – generates investment opportunities, the rate of savings and
investment may rise regardless of the distribution of income. In other words, savings and investment may
be driven by the demand-side rather than the supply-side. Also, when a large amount of savings comes
from government, corporations, and foreign sources, the distribution of personal income may play a small
role in affecting the saving rate. Finally, there is some evidence that, when appropriate institutions are
established, low income people may save at a relatively high rate. Although the achievements and
potentials of micro-finance programs such as the Grameen Bank have often, in my opinion, been
exaggerated, these programs nonetheless have established that, with appropriate policies, people with very
low incomes will save at a reasonably high rate. Experience in Indonesia also offers some interesting
examples; see Patten and Rosengard (1991).
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These arguments are set out more fully in MacEwan (1999, ch. 3).

out ways in which the policy framework presented here differs from that which is often
presented for development and poverty reduction, as in the Sachs Report. I will make no
effort to offer a complete program, but only to illustrate the implications of placing a
greater emphasis on the distribution of income. The defining idea here is that because
relative equality in the distribution of income is important along with economic growth, it
is necessary to find policies that simultaneously support both goals. The premise of the
discussion is that, contrary to the ‘conventional wisdom,’ growth with relative equality is
clearly a possibility.
Two caveats are in order. First, as I have suggested above, economic policy is in
large part a question of political power. Those who have high levels of income (and
wealth) tend to have a disproportionate share of political power, and they are unlikely to
willingly support programs that would lead to greater income equality. Therefore, any
economic policy proposals directed towards greater equality should be seen as an effort
to demonstrate what is technically possible even their adoption is politically unlikely.
Nonetheless, I will suggest why some aspects of the policy framework I will offer may
have political possibilities. Second, while I am critical of policy frameworks that do not
emphasize income distribution issues, as in the Sachs Report, many of the particular
proposals contained in such frameworks are very positive. My intention is to suggest the
limits of the framework, not to denigrate the proposals.17
The policy areas I will discuss in order to illustrate the implications of a general
program designed to attain economic development and reduce income inequality come
under four headings: social programs, land reform, macroeconomic policy, and
empowerment. There is little, if anything, that is original in these illustrations, but they
may help define a framework that departs from much of the discussion of development
and poverty reduction, a discussion that tends to ignore the distribution of income.
1. The primary element of a general program to attain economic development and
reduce income inequality would be heavy investment in social programs, schooling in
particular. An emphasis on schooling, health care, and other social programs (e.g.,
environmental preservation and repair) does not in itself distinguish the sort of policy
advocated here; a wide range of development policies, at least in their articulation if not
in their practice, advocate investment in social programs. Moreover, the provisos that
within schooling principal attention should be given to primary education and that a
similar structure should define health care investments are widely accepted. World Bank
proposals have often espoused these goals, and the Sachs Report views “ensuring
universal access to essential health services” and “ensuring universal primary education
and expanded postprimary and higher education” as central parts of its overall proposal.
(UN Millennium Project, 2005, ch. 5)
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Moreover, even while I am critical of the framework of the Sachs Report, I view it as a substantial
improvement over much analysis and policy on development and poverty reduction issues. It involves a
departure from the “Washington Consensus” and, if its proposals were implemented, it would lead to some
significant changes in the approaches of governments and international agencies to economic problems.

The problem is, however, that education, or schooling,18 is not a single thing, not
a one dimensional item of which a society has more or less. Different kinds of schools
prepare people for work and life in different ways. In almost all societies, the schooling
received by the wealthy is different from the schooling received by the poor, not simply
in terms of good-versus-bad, but in terms of the type of behaviors and skills that the
schools inculcate in their students. Because of such differences, schools can become
mechanisms to preserve, if not increase, inequalities.19 The clue that rising levels of
schooling do no necessarily lead to improvements in the distribution of income lies in the
facts that over the last several decades more schooling and more literacy has been
virtually the world-wide norm, yet there has not been a corresponding reduction of
income inequality.
To state the differences in an extreme manner: some schools prepare people to
defer to authority, follow directions, come on time, and work hard for extrinsic rewards;
other schools teach people to create, develop their ideas, solve problems, work in groups,
and understand the nature of their tasks. Both types of schools can produce more
productive workers, but they will produce very different types of workers. Most
important, they contribute to economic growth in different ways, and the ways in which
schooling is structured contribute to different degrees of equality in society. Simply put:
if schools are to make their maximum contribution to equality then the schools
themselves must be equal. Economic policies that simply provide “more schooling,” may
contribute to economic growth, but they will not make the maximum contribution to both
growth and equality.
Furthermore, “empowerment” of the poor (which I will take up shortly) is
currently an element in many, if not most, poverty reduction programs, and schooling is
usually seen as a mechanism to increase empowerment. Yet, while there is no doubt that
literacy and numeracy are important foundations for empowerment, schooling can also be
a mechanism of social control instead of empowerment (and it can also be contradictory,
containing elements that empower and elements that control). If schooling is to empower
the poor and through empowerment to contribute to equality, then both the content – the
sorts of skills and behaviors transmitted to students – and the organization of schooling
are important. In particular, it is desirable when greater equality is a goal of development
policy that the people who are served by schooling and other social programs be involved
in determining the direction and organization of those services. Schooling, primary
18

When economists say “education,” what they usually mean is “schooling.” After all, one way or another,
with or without schools, people get educated. They obtain knowledge of the society and culture in which
they live, and they obtain various skills. An illiterate peasant and a nuclear physicist are both educated, and
each knows and understands things that are beyond the ken of the other. But the nuclear physicist is
schooled, and the peasant is not. There is, it seems, something about the particular kind of education that
takes place in schools that is especially important for economic progress. This schooling-education
distinction strikes me as important, but it is not an issue I will pursue here.
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I am familiar only with U.S. studies that elaborate this sort difference and the inequalities developed in
the school system. See, for example, Carnoy and Levin (1985, ch. 5) and Bowles (1972). While the
experience of the United States may be of limited relevance to the situation in low and middle income
countries, the general findings regarding the ways the structure of schooling can exacerbate inequalities
does seem relevant.

health care, and many environmental programs offer substantial opportunities for the
poor to be involved in establishing the nature of the programs that affect them, and,
what’s more, the poor are often the best informed about their particular needs in these
areas. Simply “more schooling” is not a sufficiently defined policy.
2. In many parts of the world, land reform deserves equal status with an emphasis
on social programs as a foundation for policies that would further both growth and
equality. Land reform is important because it not only has the potential to raise the
incomes of the poor and contribute to greater output per unit of land; also, by changing
the distribution of productive wealth, it can contribute to an alteration of the distribution
of social and political power.20
Land reform, however, is today seldom on the agenda in discussions of
development policy. Instead, under the rubric of “rural development,” programs such as
that advocated in the Sachs Report put forward numerous new technologies as a means to
improve conditions in rural areas. Perhaps the most heralded such technology has been
the set of changes involved in the ‘green revolution,’ the introduction of new, more
productive seed varieties and the application of other inputs (chemical fertilizers, etc.)
that complement the new seeds. Most recently, genetic engineering has been introduced
as a further step in the same process. The Sachs Report gives emphasis to these sorts of
changes (though genetic engineering is not mentioned, perhaps to avoid the controversy),
and goes further in calling for agricultural extension work (e.g., teaching small farmers
new agricultural techniques) and offering some programs for landless laborers.
Any steps that raise agricultural productivity can have positive impacts, and both
the introduction of new agricultural technologies and agricultural extension can be useful.
However, although new agricultural technologies are theoretically neutral with regard to
scale, they often tend to have significantly greater pay-offs for larger farmers because the
larger farms have better access to credit, marketing facilities and water and a better basis
on which to take the risk (or perceived risk) of new inputs. Thus the results of this type of
rural development when it takes place within existing land tenure relationships can be the
consolidation of larger land holdings, more landlessness, greater inequality in the
countryside, and increased rural-to-urban migration.21
At the same time, changing land tenure relations through land reform is also likely
to be insufficient in bringing about rural progress in terms of both output and income
distribution. The sorts of agricultural extension services, especially access to credit and
improved marketing facilities, advocated in the Sachs Report and other rural development
proposals are a necessary component of an effective development policy. Also, effective
change in the countryside would need other important components, including: the
20

Khan (1972), in discussing then possibilities for Bangladesh, explains how, even in a situation where
land holdings are extremely small and large land owners are those with perhaps 30 acres of land, land
reform can contribute to greater productivity as well as greater equality and poverty reduction.
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An excellent description of this whole process is provided by Edelman (1980). Also, see de Janvry
(1981).

elimination of government interventions that create terms of trade unfavorable to
agriculture, as advocated, for example, by Khan and Riskin (2001, ch. 7) in the case of
China;22 support for non-agricultural rural production; and support for various forms of
rural cooperatives in which small producers can exercise more control over their
activities (measures which can bring about greater empowerment – see below). Land
reform provides the social context for a broad set of changes in rural areas, a context that
is likely to make those changes have a greater impact on production and is virtually
certain to lead towards greater equality.
3. An effective set of development policies emphasizing income equality requires a
progressive system of finance within the context of a macroeconomic policy that
maintains stability. Any economic development program must be financed. Whether the
authorities give primary attention to industrialization, physical infrastructure, or social
programs, the investment funds have to be provided. With regard to poverty reduction in
particular, the Sachs Report (p. 62) acknowledges: “To achieve the Millennium
Development Goals, huge new investments and, in many cases, better policies and
institutions are needed to implement the practical measures we know to work.” [emphasis
added] While the Report calls for an expanded role for international aid, it also
recognizes that beyond aid a substantial increase of internally generated funds will be
required to finance the “huge new investments.” Yet it offers only brief and vague
generalizations on how these funds would be generated: “[The expansion of government
spending needed to achieve the Millennium Goals] is achievable through using broadbased revenue sources, such as a value added tax, strengthening tax collection, and
redirecting current spending.” And: “Households are expected to contribute financially
within their means to sectors where the incentive effects of well designed user fees are
compatible with the overall policy objectives of ensuring effective and equitable access to
basic infrastructure and social services.” (pp. 245-46)23
In this arena of financing development programs, however, issues of
redistribution necessarily come directly to the fore. Ignoring those issues will not
eliminate them. There are only four sources of government finance – moving funds from
other uses, higher user fees, deficit spending, and higher taxes. The opportunities for the
first of these are quite limited, except in a few countries where military spending is
especially large. Higher user fees may be appropriate in some circumstances, but there is
no reason to think they would make a large contribution.
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In part, the unfavorable terms of trade imposed on agriculture in many countries are part of a policy to
limit industrial imports in order to promote national industry. As I have argued elsewhere (MacEwan,
1999, ch. 8), a country’s control of foreign trade is likely to be an important part of any comprehensive
development policy, and it may be quite reasonable to favor national economic activity over imports.
However, there are times when import limits may be applied to agricultural goods as well as industrial
goods. Moreover, even when it is reasonable for a country to bear a high cost for the development of
certain industries, there is no reason that this must cost must be disproportionately borne by agriculture.
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The Report adds the important proviso that all direct and indirect fees for primary education and basic
health care should be discontinued.

Deficit spending cannot provide a significant and lasting basis for financing new
programs without undermining stability. Although the extreme demands typical of
International Monetary Fund policies have little legitimacy, when a high level of deficit
spending is used on a continuing basis to finance development programs or deal with
external shocks (as opposed to situations where deficit spending is employed as a
traditional Keynesian counter-cyclical policy), it is likely to generate macroeconomic
imbalances that both disrupt growth and harm the poor.24 Moreover, as Khan and
Muqtada (1997, p. 1) point out: “Unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances forced
nations to a kind of stabilization which proved disastrous for the growth of output and
employment.”25 Also, it is useful to recognize that when authorities fail to confront issue
of income distribution, deficit finance can appear as an attractive option, in spite of its
long run consequences (or perhaps because those consequences are long run).
We are left with taxes. Higher tax rates have two problems. First, it is widely
believed that raising taxes is in conflict with economic growth, especially in an era of
international financial liberalization. Higher taxes, it is alleged will reduce the incentive
to invest (because the return on investment will be lowered) and encourage capital flight.
Second, higher taxes introduced as part of a development program emphasizing the
reduction of income inequality would have to be progressive taxes; indeed, where the
distribution of income is highly unequal, it is unlikely that significant revenue increases
could be attained without raising taxes on the rich disproportionately. Yet a progressive
tax system aggravates the investment incentive problem and raises problems of political
practicality.
Although these problems are often exaggerated, they are real and need to be
addressed. One part of dealing with these problems would be the introduction of capital
controls to limit capital flight as taxes are raised. Also, the details of tax proposals have
to be spelled out in some detail. For example, a value added tax as suggested in the
Sachs Report might be desirable if it were structured with exemptions for food and,
perhaps, other necessities, or if it were directly tied to compensatory measures for the
poor.26 Discussion of capital controls and the details of a tax system would require that
conflicts over income distribution be immediately and explicitly addressed – and of
24

Various sets of evidence tend to support the position that, while limited deficit and moderate inflation –
in the one to two digit range – are consistent with strong economic expansion, larger and persistent
budgetary deficits contribute to an instability that harms growth. See, for example, Bruno and Easterly
(1996) and Akerlof et al (1996).
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Elsewhere, Khan (1993) provides an analysis of the “stabilization which proved disastrous.” Focusing on
the programs prescribed by the World Bank and IMF, he provides the following understated conclusions:
“The claim that, on average, official adjustment programmes under the auspices of the World Bank and the
IMF have performed well, not only by the conventional standards of promoting adjustment and preserving
growth but also in terms of protecting the poor, is very hard to substantiate convincingly… It is hard to see
how these programmes were systematically based on any meaningful application of the criterion of
protecting the poor.” (p. 67)

26

To work politically, the ties would have to be clear and direct. Simply to argue that the whole package of
government programs would be progressive would not alleviate popular objection to a regressive tax.

course the issue of capital controls would raise conflicts with international agencies and,
at least, the U.S. government. Yet it is difficult to imagine how an effective development
program can be implemented unless these issues are addressed.27
4. Empowerment of the poor is both a goal and a means in program of poverty
reduction or in development policy directed toward greater income equality. It is a goal
because, if we accept that idea of “development as freedom” as at least a part of the
reason why we seek economic change, it is necessary for people to have practical control
over their political and economic lives (empowerment) as a foundation for freedom. It is
a means for two reasons. First, there is the issue of power and what it gets used for. As
noted above, people use their power to enhance their economic positions, and if the poor
have very little power it is unlikely that they will be able to attain any sustained
improvement of their position. Second, the knowledge about what the poor need
generally resides with the poor. A failure, therefore, to involve the poor in solutions to
the problem of poverty – i.e., a failure to empower the poor – is unlikely to be most
effective, regardless of the efforts and motivation of the authorities.
Although empowerment can have real meaning, the concept has become
somewhat of a cliché in discussions of economic development. Often empowerment of
the poor means little more than providing more income and jobs or assuming an
automatic connection between schooling and health care, on the one hand, and
empowerment, on the other hand. The Sachs Report, for example, devotes a good deal of
attention to empowerment. (Chapter 5 is entitled, “Public Investments to Empower Poor
People,” and thus implicitly justifies many of its proposals on the basis that they would
move societies towards the goal of empowering the poor). Yet, the Report’s keys to
empowerment are investments that would improve the economic, educational, and health
conditions of the poor, with virtually no attention to the process of change and how the
process of change itself would affect empowerment. That is, there is no attention –
beyond statements of the desirability of “good governance” – to the mechanisms and
institutions that could involve the poor in decisions regarding these changes and that
might provide a basis for continuing maintenance and improvement of their conditions.28
The Sachs Report’s keys to empowerment – income, jobs, health care, schooling
– are desirable in themselves and can contribute to empowerment. But there is much
more than needs to be done; mechanisms and institutions of empowerment need to be

27

Interestingly, at least on one point, the Sachs Report does come into conflict with the policies of
international agencies and the U.S. government. In listing the six criteria that should be met by the public
investment plans for a poverty reduction strategy, the Report includes laying “the ground for private sectorled economic growth, with particular support to the indigenous private sector.” [emphasis added]. (p. 65)
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The Report does devote a great deal of attention to gender equality and the empowerment of women.
This strikes me as very positive and important, though here too the issue is viewed almost entirely in
narrow economic terms with virtually no attention to institutions or mechanisms of involvement. Also, as
important as it is to empower women, it is not the same as empowering the poor. In much of the current
literature on development economics, it seems, gender issues are more readily addressed than are class
issues.

established as part of a poverty reduction and development program. The process of
change itself, the degree to which the poor are involved, also needs attention.
Schooling and other social programs such as health care and environmental
preservation and protection offer special opportunities for involvement of the poor in
reducing poverty, as I have suggested above. I have made the general argument
elsewhere (MacEwan, 1999; p. 176) in the following terms:
“…social programmes, financed and organized in the public sphere, offer
the opportunity for direct popular participation – direct democracy – in
their implementation. One of the central problems of democracy in any
large, complex society is that the great majority of the population has no
(or very limited) direct political role in the operation of economic activity.
The majority can (within constitutional limits) set government policy
regulating private economic activity, but efforts to expand that role always
run the risk of alienating business interests and undermining investment
and economic growth. Yet public programmes can involve direct
participation, direct democracy, without any such threat (or only minimal
and indirect threat) to business. So the larger the sphere of public
programmes, the larger the opportunity for democratic participation in
economic activity [i.e., the larger the opportunity for empowerment].”
This opportunity presented by social programs, however, would be realized only if it
were supported as a central part of a development program. Schools, health care centers,
and environmental projects can be designed and organized in various ways. If
empowerment is the goal, then they are best organized along participatory lines.
Another opportunity for empowerment of the poor lies in the way agriculture is
organized – in particular, in the extent to which farmer cooperatives of various sorts
receive support. When small farmers are provided with technical assistance – the
components of the rural development advanced by the Sachs Report – and even when
they are the beneficiaries of a land reform, they still face numerous problems that are
difficult, if not impossible, to solve individually. These problems include everything
from access to markets and credit to management of water and the absorption of new
technical knowledge. Cooperatives can create a potential for dealing with these sorts of
problems, and, because they require group activity, they provide a basis for
empowerment. The can become the sorts of civil society organization that are counterweights to both the market and the state. Their success, however, requires support in
various forms – for example, in the ways credit is made available and in the ways
marketing, water distribution, and the dissemination of knowledge are organized.
More generally, the issue of empowerment is one of group activity, the processes
by which people in general and the poor in particular can enter into joint action to bring
about changes in their conditions. Empowerment is not simply a matter of what is done
but of how things are done. Because it is a question of social interaction, it cannot be
accomplished on an individual basis.

***********
Perhaps the primary criticism that can be leveled against the Sachs Report is that
it is unrealistic.29 Viewing the problems of poverty in technical terms and seeking
technical fixes, the Report offers proposals that, however desirable and reasonable in
themselves, are unlikely to bring about “an end to poverty.” Failing to address the issue
of income distribution and thus failing to focus on the social nature of poverty, the
authors of the Sachs Report, like many others who offer programs for economic
development and the reduction of poverty, are unable to offer a sufficient program.
It would be disingenuous, however, to suggest that the Sachs Report is unrealistic
without addressing the realism – or lack of realism – of the proposals offered here. As I
have acknowledged above, there is a vicious circle connecting economic inequality to a
lack of political power for the poor to a continuation of economic inequality. I have no
easy answers to the question of how to break this vicious circle – no new seed, of maize
or knowledge that will solve the problem. I do, however, in conclusion have three
comments to offer:
First, the problem of economic development and poverty reduction is in large part
a political problem. One of the important functions of formulating economic proposals
that would bring about progress is to demonstrate that the problems could be solved but
for political barriers. Those political barriers are in significant part built upon a
‘conventional wisdom’ that claims that the there are no practical economic solutions to
these problems – for example, the ‘wisdom’ that income equality would harm savings or
that land reform would undermine agricultural efficiency. Proposals that show how
things could be done differently and that show the problem is not a lack of practical
economic solutions are useful in reducing the political barriers to change.
Second, social programs do offer some promise of practical implementation; they
offer a point at which it may be possible to break into the vicious circle. There is broad
recognition that schooling, health care, environmental protection and preservation, and
other sorts of social programs are necessary for social stability and economic growth.
Thus, at least in a very general form, the implementation of such programs can gain
support across social classes. Furthermore, when these programs are formulated as
universal programs, programs that are not simply focused on the poor (even though the
poor may reap the largest proportional benefit), they can also garner widespread support.
Finally, there is a long history that establishes the legitimacy of the public provision of
these sorts of programs, and this history provides a basis to withstand efforts (e.g.,
privatization) that push in the other direction. As I have emphasized above, the nature of
social programs – their content and their form – makes a great deal of difference. But, if
they can be expanded in some form, then there arises the possibility of shaping them in
29

Indeed, William Easterly (2005), reviewing Jeffrey Sachs’ (2005) book, which appeared at roughly the
same time as the Report and contains much of the same analysis and many of the same proposals, describes
it as “utopian dreams.”

ways that can bring about the most positive form of economic change.
programs provide an opening.

So social

Third, the problem or economic development and poverty reduction cannot be
solved by ignoring the problem of income distribution. I have tried to argue in various
ways – conceptual, political, and practical – that income distribution lies at the center of
the development problem. If the proposals I have offered as illustrations – the “how” of
bringing about greater equality – are impractical or insufficient, that does not mean that
income distribution can be ignored. It simply means that other means must be found to
address the issue.
It is here, in this last point, that I think that Aziz Khan has made some of this most
important contributions. The theme that arises over and over in his work is that income
distribution must be a central concern. Whether addressing poverty reduction,
employment, or economic growth, he has always tied the issues together and linked them
to the distribution of income. Others do well when they emulate his approach.
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